What is temporal ontology? by Deng, Natalja
 1 
 
What is temporal ontology? 
Natalja Deng 
(Philosophical Studies; the final publication is available at Springer via 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-017-0893-6) 
 
Abstract: Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of 
presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it’s 
surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and 
eternalists (to focus on the most widespread positions). Certain events happened that are not 
happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist (simpliciter, or else 
tenselessly)? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic 
metaphysics, skeptics’ doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, neither by 
metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light 
of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps (by Ted Sider, Christian Wüthrich, and 
Tom Stoneham). The upshot is that skeptics were right to be puzzled. The paper then 
explores a possible re-interpretation of positions in temporal ontology that links it to 
normative views about how we should live as temporal beings.  
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to motivate its title question. It’s to get the reader into a mindset 
where (s)he feels that it’s an open question,  and one with no obvious answers.  
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Though modest, this aim is in the spirit of skeptical views about temporal ontology. 
Temporal ontology is the part of ontology (the study of what there is) involving the rival 
views of presentism, eternalism, the shrinking block view, and the growing block view, 
amongst others. I’ll focus mostly on presentism and eternalism. 
Presentism in its standard form is roughly the view that only the present or only present 
things exist(s). (Sometimes ‘always’ and/or ‘necessarily’ are added.) Eternalism is usually 
taken to be the view that all times and/or events exist. Skeptics about temporal ontology 
deny that the dispute is substantive. The stance taken here is that whether or not the skeptics 
are right, their doubts have still not been sufficiently heeded. Neither core analytic 
metaphysics nor philosophy of physics has fully appreciated the extent to which the debate is 
itself an appropriate object of philosophical puzzlement. 
There is also a secondary aim to the paper, which is to explore a take on temporal ontology 
that links it to normative views about how we should live as temporal beings. This is 
intended as a possible re-interpretation of the debate, rather than as an interpretation of the 
debate as it stands (so this suggestion can’t dispel the puzzlement the paper tries to induce). 
I don’t know of a head-on way to induce puzzlement about a debate in someone who feels 
it’s perfectly clear, so my strategy is indirect. I examine prominent attempts at elucidating 
what’s at stake in the debate and show that they are problematic. Failures to illuminate are 
themselves significant and should go some way towards inducing puzzlement, both about 
why no illumination has been achieved and, by extension, about the debate itself. 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 discuss elucidation attempts by Ted Sider, Christian Wüthrich and Tom 
Stoneham, respectively. Section 5 concedes that prima facie, elucidation may be had by 
linking this debate to the one about time’s passing, but offers some reasons for caution to 
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those attracted to this move. Section 6 explores the link to normative views about how we 
should live as temporal beings. 
As mentioned, I’ll take presentism to be the view that only the present, or only present 
things exist.1 As many have pointed out, there are salient readings of this that are trivial. In 
particular, if ‘exists’ means exists now, the view says that only present things exist now, 
which is trivially true. Alternatively, if ‘exists’ means has existed, exists now, or will exist, 
then the view is trivially false: dinosaurs have existed but are not present. In interpreting the 
debate, we want to avoid attributing a trivial view (i.e. a trivially false or trivially true view) to 
either side. Call this the charity constraint. I’ll collectively refer to the various arguments that 
fit this schema as ‘the triviality challenge’ (see e.g. Meyer 2005, Dorato 2009, Savitt 2009, 
Stoneham 2009, Lombard 2010, Balaguer 2014, Tallant 2014). 
So ‘exists’ has to mean something else. The near consensus is that what it means is ‘tenseless 
existence’, or else existence simpliciter, i.e. existence full stop. 
Some would object to my treating the notions of ‘tenseless existence’ and ‘existence 
simpliciter’ as interchangeable here. For example, Daniel Deasy argues that the triviality 
challenge is based on the misguided idea that quantifiers are verbs.2 He takes standard 
presentism to be the thesis that (always) everything is present, and argues that the universal 
quantifier here isn’t a verb and therefore doesn’t admit of either a tensed or a tenseless 
reading.  
                                                
1 I confine myself to discussing this standard version of presentism, leaving aside Jonathan 
Tallant’s ‘existence presentism’ (see e.g. Tallant 2014), both because of space limitations and 
because I think similar problems afflict that version. 
2 (Deasy 2015, 4). 
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One natural interpretation of Deasy’s position is as follows: presentism says that (always) all 
that exists is present, where ‘existence’ means existence simpliciter. Fortunately, what follows 
can be taken as directed either against a formulation based on ‘tenseless existence’, or one 
based on ‘existence simpliciter’. Nothing hangs on whether both are part of the standard 
formulation.  
Standard presentism, then, is the view that only things that are present exist, full stop. Even 
when the quantifier’s wings are stretched are as wide as they can be, no non-present things 
(that are still temporal things) are caught by it (I take the metaphor from Mozersky 2011, p. 
124). My thesis is that this statement stands in need of elucidation, and that this remains the 
case even after one has digested prominent attempts at elucidation. 
2 Ideology and ontology 
In ‘Writing the book of the world’ (2011), Ted Sider uses his influential broader view in 
meta-metaphysics and related areas to show that the presentism-eternalism debate is 
substantive. This broader meta-metaphysical view, he says, allows one to make better sense 
of what is at stake in the debate than do rival meta-metaphysical views. (I won’t take a stand 
on whether that’s so.)  
To make sense of the dispute, Sider recommends that we think of it as being partly 
ideological, in the sense that it’s partly about which concepts or notions are fundamental or 
carve nature at its joints: 
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‘Do tensed concepts [carve at the joints]? […] [P]hrasing the issue as one about the 
fundamental “shape” of reality’s temporal joints helps to illuminate what are otherwise 
extremely perplexing questions.’ (p. 9) 
The support is also intended to go in the other direction: that the broader meta-metaphysical 
view helps make sense of what’s at stake in this and other metaphysical debates adds to the 
case for it. 
The eternalist’s ideology is that of first-order predicate logic, including the universal and 
existential quantifiers. These allow her to describe temporal reality as it fundamentally is, by 
quantifying over past and future entities and stating what they are like at the times they exist. 
For example, she can affirm that (fundamentally, speaking strictly, in the ontology room) 
there exist dinosaurs: ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥. 
The presentist’s ideology is more bloated. It includes not just the notions of first-order 
predicate logic, but also tense operators. These are one-place sentence operators such as ‘𝑃’ 
(it was the case that…), ‘𝑁’ (it is the case that…), ‘𝐹’ (it will be the case that…), ‘𝐴’ (it is 
always the case that…), and others. For the presentist, 𝜙 ↔ 𝑁Φ, for all Φ. Thus, 𝐹𝑎 iff 𝑎 is 
now 𝐹, and ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 iff there now are dinsoaurs. Therefore, the presentist rejects ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥, and 
claims instead that 𝑃∃𝑥𝐷𝑥.  
According to Sider, the presentist and the eternalist disagree on temporal ideology, i.e. on the 
shape of nature’s temporal joints. They also have a further disagreement about temporal ontology, 
i.e. on what exists time-wise, or what’s in the domain of temporal things. That’s because as 
we’ve seen, presentists deny, while eternalists affirm, ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥, and similarly for lots of other 
things (not just dinosaurs). 
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One skeptical idea Sider considers is that the two sides mean different things by ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’. 
Presentists think the sentence is true iff there presently exists a dinosaur, whereas eternalists 
think it’s true iff there atemporally exists a dinosaur. Sider maintains that this idea 
misconstrues what each side intends to mean. Each side intends to mean ‘whatever joint-
carving meanings are in the vicinity, regardless of whether those meanings satisfy their 
theories’ (p. 277).  
He seems to be saying that what the disputants mean by ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’ isn’t fixed by anything to do 
with their views. Rather, it’s fixed by their intention to mean something joint-carving by all 
the expressions in ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 ’. As metaphysicians, they can, if necessary, ensure that all 
expressions in ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’ carve at the joints, by stipulating that they’re to have whatever joint-
carving meanings are in the vicinity of the terms in question. As a result, ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 means that 
there exist dinosaurs, in the sense of existence that is familiar from first-order predicate logic.  
One reason one might be puzzled about this is that Sider doesn’t think of this sceptic as 
blaming the quantifier. Yet, the quantifier is one of the few expressions in ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥, and one 
whose meaning it’s natural to wonder about here.  
So suppose the sceptic is blaming the quantifier. About that, Sider says the participants can 
stamp their feet, and refer the sceptic back to the case he makes in the rest of the book for 
the view that quantifiers carve at the joints. The rest of the book offers lots of reasons to 
include in one’s ideology that of first-order predicate logic. And this dispute is to be 
understood in those terms. 
However, this makes things no less perplexing. It’s part of the ideological dispute, says Sider, 
that according to the presentist, nature’s temporal joints have a tense operator shape, not 
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just a first-order predicate logic shape. Given that ideology, ∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 is equivalent to 𝑁∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 – 
it’s now the case that there are dinosaurs. At least it’s equivalent to this on one of its readings. 
What is the other reading? 
Perhaps this is building too much of the presentist’s theory into the meaning of ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’. 
Then presumably it would also be building too much of the eternalist’s theory into the 
meaning of ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’ to think of it as behaving according to the eternalist’s ideology. That is, 
we also mustn’t think of it as attributing existence at some time ‘out there’ to dinosaurs 
(whatever that means). It doesn’t say that dinosaurs exist atemporally. But then how should 
we think of the meaning of ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’?  
Clearly, much depends on the claim that quantifiers carve at the joints. Sider’s main 
argument for this is an indispensability argument. Physics, like all other domains of enquiry, 
uses and needs to use quantifiers. Therefore, quantifiers are fundamental, they carve at the 
joints, much like, as Lewis has shown, certain predicates (‘green’) but not others (‘grue’) do. 
However, we needn’t settle this broader issue. Let’s grant for the sake of argument that the 
world has basic quantificational structure. That is, suppose that there is one notion of 
existential quantification that is central to all inquiry, and one notion of inquiry such that 
analytic metaphysics is in principle eligible for inclusion. That still doesn’t answer the 
question as to the meaning of ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥’, because the dispute is supposed to concern the nature 
of time. It’s not clear which aspect of the nature of time we thematize when we apply this 
logical notion to dinosaurs.3 What can both sides mean by ‘∃𝑥𝐷𝑥 ’ that their opposed 
                                                
3 Lawrence Lombard puts this point beautifully: ‘[T]here can be a debate between those who 
think that presently nonexistent things can now be members of classes, and that currently 
nonexistent things can now be constituents of singular propositions, and that things can 
have some properties (and bear relations to other things) at times at which they do not exist, 
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ideologies don’t bar them from meaning? Indeed, what is it to have opposing temporal 
ideologies? What does it mean to disagree about the shape of nature’s temporal joints?  
Sider also offers the skeptic a relativist way of developing his position. Here’s what relativism 
says. The relativiser finds ‘dinosaurs exist’ unintelligible, but feels he can make sense of 
‘dinosaurs exist at time t’. For that reason, he maintains that some fundamental quantifiers 
have time-slots in them: ∃𝑡, ∀𝑡. 
Sider raises three objections against relativism, of which I’ll comment on the second and 
third. First, it’s is an unattractive ideological view. We already need the non-time-relative 
quantifier in maths, logic, and physics, so this ideology is ‘fractured’. I’ll set this aside. 
Second, even if relativism is true, and the original ontological dispute made no sense, the 
original ideological dispute is alive and well. It has merely acquired a new participant. 
According to the relativiser, the shape of nature’s temporal joints is that traced out by 
temporally relativized quantifiers.  
But Sider is wrong to think these three ideological positions are on a par.  The relativiser’s 
ideology is importantly different from the other two, because it’s intelligible to anyone who 
understands temporal variation. That is, the relativiser’s ideology comes with its own ready-
made elucidation of what the question about the ‘shape of nature’s temporal joints’ is. It’s 
about what happened when. By contrast, as we’ve seen, it’s not clear how to make sense of 
the other two ideological positions. 
                                                                                                                                            
and those who don’t think so. But, it seems clear who wins that debate. More importantly, 
however, it seems clear that such a debate is not about time or the existence of things that 
exist in time.’ (2010, 70) 
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The third objection Sider raises is that relativism may well pave the way for a new debate 
about temporal ontology. The relativiser assumes that no one wants to affirm ∃!"#$𝐷𝑥. But 
why not? Why can’t a rogue relativiser affirm this? The dispute would then go as follows.  
‘∃!"#$𝑥𝐷𝑥!’, says the rogue relativiser. The original relativiser reasons with him. ‘No, come 
on. It’s not the case that ∃!"#$𝑥𝐷𝑥. Rather, ∃!"" !"##"$% !"#$% !"𝑥𝐷𝑥.’ The rogue relativiser 
replies: ‘Hear me out. ∃!"#$𝑥𝐷𝑥. Only ¬∃!"#$𝑥(𝐷𝑥 ∧ 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑖𝑛 − 2016 𝑥 ).’  
It’s hard not to feel that Sider is mis-interpreting the relativiser. In claiming to be able to 
understand ‘dinosaurs exist at t’, even as a fundamental claim, the relativiser surely meant to 
claim no more than that he understands that dinosaurs once walked the earth and then 
became extinct. His time-relative quantifier, even understood as a joint-carving quantifier, 
was intended to express no more than that. 
So the relativiser should reply to Sider’s third objection by pointing out that the envisaged 
new ontological dispute is no less puzzling than the original dispute. The question is what 
the rogue relativiser can mean by the time-relative quantifier. It seems clear that the rogue 
relativiser is expressing the uncontroversial fact about natural history using location-talk: for 
no time t, existing-t dinosaurs are located in 2016. At any time t, existing-t dinosaurs are only 
located in (e.g.) the Jurassic era. So what does the time-relative quantifier add? Again, the 
relativiser intended to capture with the new quantifier no more than the undisputed fact of 
natural history.  He should be as puzzled about his opponent, and the new dispute, as he was 
about the original one. 
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3 Physics to the rescue? 
Christian Wüthrich has argued extensively that modern physics presents a devastating 
challenge to presentism. In ‘Demarcating presentism’ (2011), he responds to skeptical 
arguments and argues that they fail. 
Wüthrich starts out by taking presentism to be the view that the ‘the sum total of physical 
existence can be organized in a three-dimensional manifold’. He maintains that the 
disagreement is straightforward, since the presentist posits a subset of the events posited by 
the eternalist: 
‘[T]here is plenty of room for disagreement, if we accept that there exists a proper subset 
relation between the set of the [events] of the presentist and the corresponding eternalist set.’ 
It’s true that in some sense, the presentist intends to ‘posit’ fewer things than the eternalist. 
For example, Caesars’ crossing the rubicon is ‘posited’ only by the eternalist. However, this 
is no more than a starting point from which to engage with the triviality challenge. The 
challenge is to use this kind of preliminary understanding to explicate two opposed, non-
trivial theses. It’s to explain what it means to disagree about whether a historical event exists. 
Everyone thinks it existed in the sense that it happened, and no one thinks it exists now in 
the sense that it’s currently happening. Beyond this, what can be at stake? What is it about 
the nature of events that presentists and eternalists are able to disagree about?   
Wüthrich doesn’t feel the force of this worry and thinks the following argument by Steven 
Savitt is based on a simple mistake. Suppose we think of the presentist thesis as  
(1) ‘Necessarily, if x exists simpliciter, then x presently exists’.  
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If we follow Lewis and take ‘existence simpliciter’ to concern a domain that includes 
everything in all possible worlds, says Savitt, then (1) equivalent to  
(2) ‘Necessarily, if x presently exists or x did exist or x will exist or x possibly exists, then x 
presently exists’.  
This, Savitt says, is trivially false (see also Meyer 2005). Wüthrich disagrees:  
‘The problem […] with Savitt's dismissal of characterizing the debate in terms of 
existence simpliciter is that it rests on an invalid argument: the presentist interprets 
existence simpliciter in (1) to have narrow range such as to exclude anything that is 
non-present, yet (2) will only come out as false if the quantification ranges over at 
least something that is non-present. But it is of course a necessary condition for an 
inference to be valid that the range be fixed.’ 
The idea seems to be that (2) follows from (1) on either a ‘presentist’ and an ‘eternalist’ 
interpretation of the range of quantification, but not if we switch from one to the other. 
Presentists are committed to (1) only if we keep the range ‘tightly presentist’, in which case 
(2) follows but ‘becomes non-trivially true’ – by the presentist’s lights, presumably. 
Meanwhile, with an ‘eternalist’ range, (2) follows from (1) too, and both are indeed trivially 
false, but that’s as expected. It’s why the eternalist rejects them. 
We can agree that talk of (2) doesn’t help much in understanding (1), but that, presumably, is 
Savitt’s point. What should either (1) or (2) be taken to say when the range is kept ‘tightly 
presentist’? Indeed, how can that be the right way to put the presentist’s position? Presentists 
say they are not restricting the range of quantification; that’s why (1) talks of existence 
simpliciter. If presentists restrict the domain of quantification when quantifying 
unrestrictedly, then their position is trivially false. Since all that exists, exists, positing less 
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won’t do. For reasons of charity, we want to avoid attributing that position to presentists. So 
what does (1) say? Savitt’s point is that (2) doesn’t help answer that question.  
Wüthrich maintains that our clear understanding of ‘physical existence’ allows us to answer 
the question: presentists are saying that only some of all the existing events physically exist. 
‘[W]hat could be more fundamental […]?’ If a contrast class is needed, ‘it is unclear what 
could keep us, in principle, from starting to list entities which do not physically exist’ (2011, 
3).  
But this won’t help, for familiar reasons. We’re asking what it is for historical events, events 
that happened, like Caesar’s crossing the rubicon, to not physically exist. Such events may in 
some respects be a little like Santa Claus, or like pseudo-history, but since they did happen, 
there is an important dissimilarity.  
Wüthrich ultimately offers the following solution. Take a four-dimensional manifold 𝑀 with 
a certain topological and differential structure. Eternalism, he says, is the view that says all 
events in 𝑀 exist and stand in the spatiotemporal relations encoded in the metric 𝑔!" 
defined on 𝑀. Presentism, on the other hand, partitions 𝑀 into past, present, and future 
events. It posits an equivalence relation 𝑆 whose equivalence classes contain ‘simultaneous’ 
events. It then restricts existence to one privileged such class, namely those events 
‘simultaneous’ with the ‘here-now’. The first step famously puts it at odds with modern 
physics, particularly special relativity. 
There is a strong temptation to jump from this conflict with physics to the conclusion that 
the debate must be genuine: if physics rules against a position, it must say something. But 
what physics straightforwardly conflicts with is the first step, i.e. the idea that simultaneity is 
absolute or that there is distant simultaneity, and that there is such a thing as a global ‘now’. 
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Whether it also conflicts with the second step is not so clear. And it’s the second step that 
constitutes presentism.  
One way to see this is to consider the position that says the past, present and future all exist. 
This is a view that has often gone by the name of eternalism. Indeed, this view has gone by 
the name rather more often than the view Wüthrich calls eternalism. And it too relies on the 
notion of a global present, since ‘past’ and ‘future’ are most likely intended to refer to sets of 
equivalence classes of 𝑆. Thus, if we have solved the triviality challenge, the solution has to 
be contained in the second step, i.e. in the restriction of ‘physical existence’ to a subset of the 
events in the manifold. Btu that’s just the characterization of the debate we started out with.4 
Wüthrich is adamant that considerations of the grounding problem (understood as the 
problem of what makes e.g. ‘Caesar crossed the rubicon’ true, on presentism) and of 
temporal passage are out of place in this discussion.  He anticipates problems for presentists 
as to how ‘the abstracta relate to the physically existing events’, which he sees as related to 
the grounding problem, but insists that those are not relevant here. Similarly, he says that 
passage is no necessary part of presentism, and that a ‘Heraclitean’ demand for a dynamic 
succession of presents is ‘simply misplaced qua objection to the substantiality of the debate’. 
‘It may well be the case that any attempt to accommodate animation will be frustrated either 
by triviality or by incoherence’, but that’s not relevant. Why saddle the presentist with 
anything so unpleasant? Presentism is an ontological thesis, ‘not an ideological statement about 
the qualities - dynamical or otherwise - of that which exists’ (Wüthrich 2013, 2).  
In a way the grounding issue is indeed not that relevant. This is because of the charity 
constraint. We’re assuming that presentists can agree that certain events happened, and that 
                                                
4 Savitt (manuscript, pp. 26-29), which came to my attention after writing this article, argues 
for a similar conclusion. 
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propositions expressing this are true. That is, we’re assuming that there are ways of solving 
the grounding problem, if it arises. (The next section discusses an explicit attempt to 
elucidate the debate through consideration of the grounding problem; I’ll argue that it runs 
into trouble with the charity constraint.) 
However, the passage issue is not so easily bracketed. The idea of a view that ‘posits’ only a 
subset of some manifold’s set of events invites the question of which subset the view ‘posits’. 
49BC? 1980? A day in 2016? The intended answer is that the answer changes, as time passes. 
That is, the idea is that it’s not a fixed matter which events the view attributes ‘physical 
existence’ to. ‘The present’ is to be understood as an indexical, picking out the time at which 
it’s used. This suggests that temporal passage and the ‘Heraclitean’ idea of a dynamic 
succession of presents are not optional add-ons to a ‘core’ presentist thesis but rather part 
and parcel of the view. I’ll come back to this point in section 5 below. For now what matters 
is that Wüthrich’s subset proposal is of no help with the triviality challenge. Keeping the 
question of whether what exists changes firmly separate from a supposed ‘core’ presentist 
thesis only makes the position more puzzling.  
 It’s easy to mis-construe the dialectical significance of the triviality challenge.  Wüthrich, 
following others, treats it as a problem for presentists only. But that can’t be right.5  A 
challenge to a debate can’t leave one side ‘the uncontested game in town’ (Wüthrich 2011, 5). 
For one side to win, the other has to lose, and both have to be well ‘demarcated’.  
                                                
5 Takeshi Sakon also makes this point (2015: 1091). 
 15 
4 Grounding the debate 
Tom Stoneham shares these worries about the notion of event’s existence simpliciter, or 
tenseless existence. But he thinks the debate can still be made intelligible if we think of it in 
terms of truthmaking, and thus in relation to a version of the grounding problem.6  
According to Stoneham, both the eternalist and the presentist accept a version of the 
following truthmaker principle, TM (also known as truthmaker maximalism): 
‘(TM) [For all propositions <p>:] If <p> is true, then there exists some object x, such that 
the existence of x strictly implies the truth of <p>.’ (212) 
The presentist accepts the following disambiguation of TM: 
‘(TM1) [For all propositions <p>:] If <p> is true, then there now exists some object x, such 
that <x exists> strictly implies <p>.’ (212) 
The eternalist rejects this but upholds a different disambiguation of TM: 
‘(TM4) [For all propositions <p>:] If <p> is true, then either there is, was or will be some 
object x, such that <x exists> strictly implies <p>.’ (213) 
This, Stoneham says, is a genuine disagreement, because TM1 is non-trivial.  
The first thing to note about this proposal is that TM4 is itself puzzling. We are to make do 
without any notion of existence that isn’t the familiar tensed notion. So <x exists> here is 
presumably present-tensed. But why would a dinosaur x that used to exist be such that <x 
                                                
6  Jonathan Tallant also rejects Stoneham’s proposal, but his criticisms are based on 
substantial intuitions about which truthmaker principles to endorse in general (Tallant 2014).  
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now exists> strictly implies  <dinosaurs existed>? And even if it was, why would that matter, 
since <x now exists> is presumably false?  
So what, one might say. The eternalist still rejects TM1, so there is still a substantive 
disagreement. But Stoneham is right to frame the discussion in terms of TM, and to 
emphasize that both sides must accept a version of TM. Mere rejection versus acceptance of 
TM1 signals a disagreement alright, but not one whose substance is clear. If the eternalist 
rejects TM1, we naturally want to know whether that is because he rejects TM (in toto), or 
because he has a different view of what makes true certain propositions. If he rejects TM, we 
want to know why, and how the resulting view relates to a view that includes TM1. If he 
accepts TM, we need to know in which form he accepts it, if not in the form of TM4. 
Note that the difficulty arises precisely from wanting to do without the notion of tenseless 
existence. The following disambiguation also does without that notion, and is free of these 
problems. However, as Stoneham notes, it’s trivially true: 
‘TM2: [For all propositions <p>:] If <p> is true, then either there exists some object x, such 
that <x exists> strictly implies <p>, or there existed some object x such that <x existed> 
strictly implies <p>, or there will exist some object x such that <x will exist> strictly implies 
<p>.’ (212) 
To understand the disagreement over TM1, we need to know what it’s opposed to, while not 
hearing it as trivially false.  
However, suppose for the sake of argument that TM4 is not puzzling at all. It seems the 
presentist can accept it too. TM4, after all, is weaker than TM1. It just (somehow) says all 
truthmakers are such that they either existed, exist, or will exist. TM1 goes further and says 
that in particular, they all exist now.  
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There is of course no formal problem with this, but on closer inspection it too is puzzling. 
TM4 is the defining principle of eternalism, and yet the presentist accepts it too. For the 
presentist, as for anyone else, <dinosaurs existed> is true (or so we’re charitably assuming). 
So dinosaurs existed. And that’s all it takes to for them to make true ‘dinosaurs existed’, 
according to TM4. Why then posit TM1 in addition – how can ‘dinosaurs existed’ not 
already have a truthmaker, even on presentism? 
The solution to all these worries is to re-introduce tenseless existence, or existence 
simpliciter. For the presentist, dinosaurs may have existed, but they don’t exist, and that’s 
what makes them unfit for truthmaking. Only existing things can do that, and they only 
include presently existing things, like presently existing uninstantiated dinosaur haecceities. 
By contrast, for the eternalist, dinosaurs exist, so they can do the job. But of course this is to 
give up the game in the context of Stoneham’s discussion. Talk of truthmaking, contra 
Stoneham, doesn’t allow one to side-step intelligibility problems afflicting notions like 
tenseless existence. 
5 A concession 
In section 3 I suggested that temporal passage is part and parcel of the view that presentism 
is supposed to be. But if that’s so, then doesn’t the passage issue offer a way to elucidate 
what’s at stake?  
The short answer is that for all that I’ll say in this paper, it does. The link to temporal 
passage offers a prima facie promising way to make sense of what’s at stake. The dynamicity-
stasis contrast exerts a powerful pull on the philosophical imagination. There are reasons to 
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think the contrast is less substantial than it seems, but I won’t argue for that here.7 The claim 
in this paper is that it’s difficult to make sense of temporal ontology as long as one brackets 
the passage issue. Since, as we have seen, the link between presentism and temporal passage 
is contested, this is in a way a small concession.8 
Nonetheless, it’s worth saying a little more about the connection. The reason passage is 
relevant is that it can feel illuminating to be told that on presentism (as on other non-
eternalist views e.g. the growing block view), what’s in one’s ‘temporal ontology’ changes. 
This claim can seem to give one an inkling of what it is to include an event in one’s 
‘temporal ontology’ in the first place. 
However, one caveat can be noted right away. A large part of what makes the dynamicity-
stasis contrast compelling is that it’s bound up with our sense of freedom and of the 
openness of the future. That’s especially so in the context of the temporal ontology debates. 
It can seem as if there must be something at stake, since one position intuitively threatens 
our freedom and the others don’t. And as will become clear shortly, I want to concede that it 
may be possible to affix meaning to positions in temporal ontology via our sense of their 
practical import (more on this below). But the idea that eternalism threatens our freedom is 
problematic. Therefore, any support it lends to the sense of a dynamicity-contrast between 
presentism and eternalism is compromised. 
Stoneham’s discussion demonstrates the problem. He helpfully distinguishes between 
determinism, bivalence, and eternalism. Determinism is the thesis that facts about the 
present plus the laws of nature entail the facts about the future (as well as, we may add, the 
                                                
7 See e.g. Deng 2013. 
8 See also the closely related debate over whether presentism is a version of the A-theory (e.g. 
Tallant 2012). 
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past). By ‘bivalence’ he means bivalence for future contingents, i.e. the view that future 
contingent propositions are true or false. The upshot of his discussion is that whether the 
future is open depends on whether eternalism is true, i.e. whether the truthmakers stay the 
same over time. And this issue is orthogonal to whether determinism holds.  
Both eternalism and determinism imply bivalence, but for different reasons. On eternalism, 
the current facts include those about the future, whereas on determinism, the current facts 
(perhaps in addition, on eternalist determinism) entail those about the future.  
The point I want to make about this is that the (prima facie!) threat to freedom posed by 
determinism is rather more straightforward than any supposed threat posed by eternalism. 
(So I might also have said that if there’s an issue about openness, understood as one about 
our freedom, it’s to do with determinism; but we needn’t quibble about the label ‘openness’.) 
The determinism thesis is relatively clear: given the laws, the present (or any other) state of 
the world fixes its state at all times. But on reflection, it’s still not clear what it means to say 
that the present state includes the future state, or that the facts that presently obtain include 
future facts (i.e. facts about the future). And that’s highlighted by Stoneham’s point that 
eternalism is compatible with a lack of determinism. On a non-determinist eternalism, the 
present state and the laws leave open what will happen. But future facts form part of the 
truthmaker base. Should that worry one? It’s simply not clear. The conviction that eternalism 
threatens our freedom is predicated on a firmer grasp on eternalism than anyone should 
profess to have. 
 20 
6 On living in the present 
Let’s now revisit the idea that it may be possible to affix meaning to positions in temporal 
ontology via our sense of their practical import. Admittedly, this way of putting it can’t be 
quite right. What does ‘their’ refer to – if the positions have practical import, how can they 
lack substance? So here’s a better way of putting it. It may be possible to affix meaning to 
positions in temporal ontology via certain practical, and in particular normative, aspects of 
our lives as temporal beings. The meaning in question can’t be the meaning the positions 
currently have (if any); so this doesn’t answer the difficulty the paper has grappled with. 
Rather, this final section explores a possible re-interpretation of temporal ontology.   
To begin with, note that the charity constraint has played an important role in the previous 
sections. The constraint was that neither side should end up trivial. For example, neither side 
should end up classifying the ordinary claim ‘dinosaurs existed’ as false, because that, 
arguably, makes that side’s view trivially false. Or take the really radical view on which all 
ordinary past and future tensed claims are false. (I am ignoring the notion of ‘quasi-truth’ 
here.) On such a view, one might say, there was no past, and there will be no future. The 
charity constraint rules such interpretations out. Perhaps it isn’t always appropriate to apply 
it. Perhaps there have been some who have defended such radical views under the label 
‘presentism’. But by and large, the position labelled ‘presentism’ is intended to be much less 
radical than that.9 By and large, the charity constraint is in place for good reason.  
                                                
9 Pace Lewis: ‘In saying that there are no other times, as opposed to false representations 
thereof, [presentism] goes against what we all believe. No man, unless it be at the moment of 
his execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone believe that he has no 
past.’ (1986, 204) 
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However, there is a view that only the present ‘exists’ that is radical in a different way. So far, 
there has been a presupposition that the debate comfortably fits into theoretical philosophy 
and, in particular, into metaphysics understood as a subject that aims to describe the world, 
in much the same way as science (construed in a realist way) does. If we now ask again what 
it could mean to say of a past event that it doesn’t exist, one possible answer lifts that 
presupposition. To say a past event doesn’t exist (simpliciter) is to deny that it should play 
any role in a person’s emotional and mental life, or perhaps to deny that it should play the 
role past events usually play in people’s emotional and mental lives. It’s to take the existence 
simpliciter of an event to be the feature that makes an event worthy of a (certain kind of) 
practical response.10 Put simply, it’s to take ‘only the present exists’ to be synonymous with 
the advice to ‘live in the present’.  
One way to develop this latter idea is suggested by Kieran Setiya’s philosophical diagnosis of 
the midlife crisis as a symptom of a life dominated by ‘telic’ activities rather than ‘atelic’ ones 
(Setiya 2014). Telic activities are oriented towards a final state: buying a house, starting a 
family, getting a job, walking to the shops. Atelic activities, on the other hand, are activities 
that aren’t so oriented, and which can’t be completed (though one can of course cease engaging 
in them): spending time with one’s family, doing one’s job well, living a decent life, going for 
a walk. The idea is that atelic activities help us relate to time in the way most conducive to 
avoiding a particular emotional predicament. As Setiya notes, this is a philosophical take on 
the familiar advice to ‘live in the present’. The claim of this section is that one can re-
interpret the ontological slogan ‘only the present exists’ by equating it with the 
recommendation to relate to time in this way. On this view, presentism doesn’t aim to 
describe time; rather, it aims to guide our relationship to it. 
                                                
10 Cf Cockburn 1997. 
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So far this has been about presentism only, but there are also normative developments of 
eternalism. Perhaps Spinoza is relevant here; think of the injunction to have similar attitudes 
towards an event no matter whether it’s past, present or future. Such an eternalism would 
also amount to an injunction to treat the past and the future differently from how we usually 
treat them, but the recommended attitude(s) would be different.  
The growing block view would perhaps most naturally be re-interpreted as an endorsement 
of attitudes as they usually are. Past and future events play very different roles in our 
emotional and mental lives. The view that the past and the present exist but the future does 
not might amount to an endorsement of this emotional asymmetry. 
Thus, on this way of thinking, both presentism and eternalism would amount to revisionary 
views, involving recommendations to change aspects of how we live our lives as temporal 
beings. In particular, both would recommend jettisoning the emotional asymmetry.  
A natural response to this kind of approach is that it betrays confusion. There is the question 
of the existence of events. And perhaps there is also a question about the intrinsic value that 
attaches to certain events. And we can ask how these two questions relate to one another, 
and whether either notion can play a justificatory role for emotions and other attitudes. But 
at least some of these connections will be hard to argue for. Why should the existence of 
events imply anything about their intrinsic value, much less anything directly about the 
justification of attitudes? It certainly doesn’t do much to explain our attitudes (Callender 
2012); so why should it justify? 
I feel the force of this worry. But I’m not sure it’s the only way of looking at the matter. The 
claim isn’t that there is a close connection between positions in temporal ontology and 
claims about the intrinsic value of past and future events, or between positions in temporal 
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ontology and claims about the justification of emotions and other attitudes. Rather, the claim 
is that there is a way of re-interpreting the positions on which the link to normativity is 
constitutive of their content.  
Some motivation for looking at things this way derives from the main claim of the paper. 
There is a real difficulty with making sense of the notion of an event’s existence simpliciter. 
At the same time, there is an unabating and thoroughly familiar tradition of making such 
claims outside of the ontology room. That tradition, it seems, constitutively links the 
(non)existence of events with the justification of attitudes. Why not think this is a way to 
construe the notion?  
Here’s a reason why not: it’s not clear why this should count as a re-interpretation. Doesn’t 
my suggestion just amount to affixing a bizarre new meaning to familiar strings of words, 
entirely unrelated to their actual, current meaning? 
But this objection can be met. First of all, it’s hard to say what counts as a re-interpretation 
since the current meaning of these positions is unclear. Second, and more importantly, keep 
in mind that the puzzlement emphasized throughout concerned not existence simpliciter per 
se, but the notion of an event’s or time’s existence simpliciter, when that’s understood as a 
theoretical notion. By contrast, it doesn’t seem bizarre to couch practical injunctions about 
how to relate to time in terms of events’ or times’ (non)existence simpliciter. There, the 
notion of an event’s existence makes some sense. Moreover, this is the same notion of 
existence as the one intended to play a role in temporal ontology, the logical notion familiar 
from first-order predicate logic. So there seems to be enough continuity here to speak of a 
re-interpretation.   
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This has been no more than a brief exploration of the viability of this kind of approach to 
temporal ontology. In a longer treatment, more would have to be said about the attitudes in 
question, and about potential wider implications for how to understand ontological claims.  
In closing, it’s worth pointing out that such a re-interpretation would not threaten claims 
about the descriptive nature of other debates in the philosophy of time. Arguably, as long as 
physics itself gives us no reason to make use of ontological distinctions in connection with 
time, the fate of temporal ontology need not concern us (qua theoretical philosophers). In 
particular, there could still be many other substantive, descriptive disagreements in the 
philosophy of time. Their substantivity would be a consequence of their close link to 
controversies regarding the nature of time and spacetime in physics.  
7 Conclusion 
I have examined three prominent attempts at elucidating what’s at stake between presentists 
and eternalists. None of them should leave us satisfied: as regards Sider’s position, we should 
be puzzled about what it is to disagree about the shape of nature’s temporal joints; as regards 
Wüthrich’s position, we should keep firmly in mind that an answer to the skeptic would 
require two opposed non-trivial theses; and as regards Stoneham’s proposal, talk of 
grounding only helps if we can also help ourselves to the notion of existence simpliciter as 
applied to events, in which case there is no need for talk of grounding (in order to elucidate 
what’s at stake). I then conceded that for all I’ve said here, a link to the passage debates may 
provide elucidation, but also suggested that there is reason to be cautious about this link. 
The sense that there is a dynamicity-stasis contrast between positions in temporal ontology 
partly derives from the idea that eternalism somehow threatens our freedom. And that idea 
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is problematic, because it too presupposes a firmer grasp on eternalism than anyone should 
profess to have.  
Finally, I briefly sketched a possible take on positions in temporal ontology on which they 
amount to recommendations to relate to time in particular ways. On this re-interpretation 
(which is not intended as an account of what’s currently at stake, if anything), presentism 
would amount to the recommendation to ‘live in the present’, which has recently been given 
a philosophical spin by Kieran Setiya. Eternalism might, in a Spinozistic vein, amount to the 
recommendation to have similar attitudes to events no matter when they happened. In 
closing, I pointed out that such a re-interpretation need not threaten claims about the 
descriptive nature of non-ontological debates in the philosophy of time. 11 
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